Montana Case on Late Notice Calls Into Doubt Technical Coverage Defenses

In a new decision the Montana Supreme Court has confirmed that in order to avoid its coverage obligations based on a technical defense such as late notice, a liability insurer must show that it suffered "prejudice."  The case is a good illustration of courts' general skepticism toward "technical" coverage defenses asserted by insurers, but also of how the details of any particular lawsuit -- or settlement -- can complicate the coverage analysis. (I first wrote about this case in July of last year).

The decision in Atlantic Casualty v. Greytak  essentially restores the status quo about the "notice-prejudice rule" in Montana.  Under the notice-prejudice rule the insurer must show that its ability to defend the case and prevent a large judgment against the insured was materially harmed by the late notice.  The trial court in the Greytak case decided that a 2011 decision from the Montana Supreme court, Steadele v. Colony Insurance had overturned Montana law adopting the rule, making the prompt notice  provision in a standard liability policies a "condition of forfeiture," meaning that the insurance company did not need to prove prejudice.   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified that narrow legal question to the Montana Supreme Court.

In Greytak the insured was sued for negligence leading to property damage.  The claimant and the insured entered into an agreement whereby the insured would tender the claim to its liability carrier, and if the insurer did not pick up the defense or file a declaratory judgment action the claimant could enter a stipulated judgment against the insured, but agree to only pursue collection from the insured's insurance.  The insured tendered the claim and the carrier did not pick up, whereupon a stipulated judgment was entered in state court.  (The facts are disputed about whether the claimant was actually entitled to file the stipulated judgment, because the insurer had filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit before the state-court judgment).  The state-court judgment was set aside and the coverage action proceeded.

The Montana court clarified that Steadele did not reverse the law on the "notice-prejudice rule," pointing out that in Steadele the Court had found that the insurer was prejudiced as a matter of law, because the insured had stipulated to a monetary judgment before the insurer was given any notification.  In Greytak, by contrast, the parties' agreement allowed the insurer the chance to step in and defend, which it did not do.

The "notice-prejudice rule" is clearly established as the law in Oregon (Lusch v. Aetna), Washington (Canron v. Federal Insurance), and Alaska (Weaver Bros. v. Chappel). 

Interestingly, all of the Montana justices agreed about the notice-prejudice rule, but there were two dissenting opinions.   The dissents argued that the court should have gone beyond the narrow question certified by the Ninth Circuit to find that the insurer was prejudiced as a matter of law by the insured's and the claimant's conduct.  The insurer's briefs on appeal argued strenuously that it had indeed been prejudiced because the insured failed to cooperate with it after it attempted to appoint defense counsel, and because the claimant had filed the state-court judgment in violation of the settlement agreement.  The Montana Supreme Court's majority elected not to go beyond the certified question, however, leaving the issue of actual prejudice up to the federal trial court to resolve.  In light of what the trial court did below, I would say that things don't look good for the claimant on that score.

Oregon Supreme Court Accepts Review of Two Important Insurance Disputes

The Oregon Supreme Court recently accepted for review two cases with potentially lasting implications for insurance coverage disputes in the state.

The first case is a mandamus ruling - the court decided to accept for review a trial court's ruling in Liberty Surplus Insurance v. Seabold Construction on a hot evidence issue important to bad-faith coverage litigation.  In Seabold the company and its liability insurer are locked in a dispute over Liberty's handling of Seabold's defense in a construction-defect matter; Seabold contends that Liberty acted in bad faith in connection with settlement of the dispute.  During the critical time period -- while settlement negotiations were going on in the underlying case -- Liberty was acting through coverage counsel, which is commonplace in such situations.  Once the coverage litigation got underway, however, Seabold demanded to see the communications with and work done by the insurer's "coverage counsel" on the theory that at least part of the time the attorney was acting as a claims adjuster.  Under the reasoning of Cedell v. Farmers, a Washington case (and its progeny, discussed in this blog post from 2013), Seabold argued -- successfully -- that there was no absolute attorney-client privilege when "coverage counsel" is performing some of the business functions of a liability carrier.  The trial court ordered Liberty Mutual to produce counsel's communications (initially directly to Seabold, amended to production for review by the court), and Liberty Mutual sought a writ of mandamus -- essentially, appellate review in the middle of a case -- to block enforcement of the trial court's order.

The issue that the court has identified for resolution is whether attorney-client privilege applies despite counsel's involvement in "investigating and adjusting" the claim.  This is the issue that Cedell and other courts outside of Oregon have decided in favor of policyholders, and one would think that this court would go the same way.  However, in the Crimson Trace discovery dispute (which did not involve insurance) the court proved itself very protective of the attorney-client privilege in an institutional context, so "all bets are off," as they say.

The second case accepted for review (back on March 31) is the 2014 Fountaincourt Homeowners Ass'n v. Fountaincourt Development decision from the Court of Appeals.  In that decision the Court of Appeals confirmed that a claimant who obtains a judgment against an insured after trial may pursue that insured's insurance assets in a garnishment proceeding as a judgment creditor, and that during resolution of the garnishment the insurer has the burden of proving that the judgment was not covered where there is prima facie evidence that at least some of the jury's award was for covered damages.  That decision was very beneficial for claimants concerned about being able to collect on a judgment.

The Supreme Court's statement of the issues on review is rather breathtaking, and will ensure that the case is closely watched.  Rather than try to summarize, set out below are the issues on review from the court's statement:

(1) If a general verdict is returned against an insured entity in a mixed coverage case (i.e., one involving some damage that is payable by an insurer and some damage that is not), and the insurer defended under a reservation of rights, can the insured establish coverage for the awarded damages based on the general verdict? (2) Does defective work by an insured contractor constitute "property damage" if that term is defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible property"? (3) Can an insured establish a prima facie case for insurance coverage with evidence showing only the possibility that a judgment is for damages within the insuring agreement of a liability policy? (4) If a liability insurer's policy is garnished by a judgment creditor and a disputed question of fact must be resolved to determine if the insurer is obligated to pay the judgment, is the insurer entitled to a jury trial in the garnishment proceeding?

What is surprising here is the Court's indication that it will take up some questions that many had thought were largely settled and were not the most controversial of the Court of Appeals' decisions.  One can hope that the Court's indication that it will review those questions is only intended to settle any doubt.  However because so much is at stake if the Court has decided to revisit those issues, this case promises to attract a lot of attention and amicus participants, and its resolution could shape (or re-shape) Oregon coverage law for a long time.

WA Fed. Court Broadens When Insurer May Go Beyond Complaint to Deny Defense

In Allstate v. A.R., a late-July decision from a federal court -- the Western District of Washington -- the court held that an insurer may rely on facts outside the "four corners" of the complaint to deny the duty to defend if the issue is whether the plaintiff is an "insured" under the policy and therefore subject to an "insured-versus-insured" type exclusion.  In the underlying case a minor sued her mother for negligently permitting her to be alone with her grandfather, who abused the minor.  The mother's homeowner's insurance policy with Allstate had an exclusion for claims brought by another "insured" and defined "insured" to include any relative who "resided" with the insured defendant.  The underlying complaint did not specify whether the minor lived with her mother, although in fact the minor apparently did live with her mother most of the time, but also lived sometimes with her father, and with her grandparents.  Allstate investigated where the minor resided, and came to the conclusion that the exclusion applied.



In the coverage case the minor protested that Allstate was not permitted to go outside the "four corners" of the complaint and that doing so was bad faith.  The court noted that in Woo v. Fireman's Fund the Washington Supreme Court had held that an insurer can investigate facts relating to whether a defendant is an insured and rely on those facts in its defense coverage determination.  The court then extended the Woo reasoning to coverage Allstate's investigation into the minor's living situation, reasoning that the question Allstate was trying to answer was whether the minor was an "insured," and held that the exclusion did apply, and that Allstate had not acted in bad faith.



The problem with the court's reasoning, of course, is that Woo did not concern a policy exclusion, and Washington courts have held that an exclusion may not be the basis for a denial of defense based on extrinsic evidence.  The court's characterization in this case of Allstate's investigation as involving "insured status" is facile - what Allstate was really investigating was an exclusion.  And the court's extension of Woo to this situation is not supported by Woo's reasoning, which has everything to do with helping defendants get coverage.  Because of this flaw this case may be the subject of an appeal, so stay tuned.

Washington Court Affirms Bad Faith Verdict In Excess of Stipulated Judgment

Clarifying Washington law, Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals has held that a jury is not limited in what it awards on a bad faith claim to the amount that the policyholder and the claimant had agreed to as the judgment in the underlying dispute.  The set up: in Miller v. Kenny a young driver crashed his car injuring himself and three passengers (the car actually belonged to one of the passengers).  Driver's insurer, Safeco, played games with policy limits and its evaluation of the case, putting the insured at risk of a significant judgment against him well in excess of policy limits.  The insured driver and one of the passengers agreed to a stipulated judgment against the insured that was over policy limits, with an assignment of the insured's claims against Safeco to the passenger, and a covenant that the passenger would not seek to enforce the judgment except to the extent of the passenger's rights against Safeco.  The parties followed Washington's procedures for a reasonableness hearing, and it appears that Safeco did not contest the reasonableness of the covenant judgment.  The judgment was for $4.15 million (exclusive of the policy limits, which Safeco paid).

But at the bad faith hearing the passenger, as assignee of  the policyholder's bad faith claim, put on evidence of damage to the driver caused by Safeco's bad faith that went well beyond the amount of the covenant judgment.  The jury ended up awarding the passenger/assignee $13 million, inclusive of the covenant judgment amount.  Post-trial the court added prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and attorney fees, and some of the damages award was trebled under the Consumer Protection Act. The final judgment was for $21,837,286.73.


On appeal, Safeco argued that under Besel v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wisc., 146 Wn.2d 730, 736, 49 P.3d 887 (2002), which held that the amount of a covenant judgment, when found to be reasonable, is the “presumptive measure of the insured's harm,” the jury cannot award more than the amount of the covenant judgment.  Not so, said the Court of Appeals in Miller; the covenant judgment is the presumptive floor to the insured's harm, but not a ceiling.  The Miller court went on to describe the different kinds of harm that the insured can suffer which may be provenin a bad faith action, above and beyond the covenant judgment amount:  damage to "credit rating, damage to reputation, loss of business opportunities, loss of control of the case..., loss of interest, attorney fees and costs, financial penalties for delayed payments, and emotional distress, anxiety, and fear."

Miller is an important milepost in Washington's evolving judicial recognition of the extraordinary power that liability insurers have over the lives of  their insureds, and the catastrophic harm that insurers can cause when they try to play things close to the vest in order to save themselves some money.  Miller may have the unfortunate effect of motivating carriers to contest reasonableness hearings, in order to get an early shot at reducing the net recovery on  a bad faith claim.  In the end, that will be a small price to pay for the benefits of this case (assuming that Miller is upheld by the Washington Supreme Court). 

Adjuster Read Canceled Policy, Denied Claim, Committed Bad Faith

One assumption that even many commercial-lines policyholders make is to assume that the insurance adjuster that they are dealing with is an "expert" on their insurance coverage (ref. "You're in good hands...").  As if anyone needed one more example that that simply is not a safe assumption to make, read in disbelief the case linked below, from Judge Suko in the Eastern District of Washington.  The insured tendered a massive lawsuit to its carrier, whose adjuster apparently read only a canceled policy form as part of his "investigation" prior to denial, and did not catch the fact that coverage was specifically provided by an endorsement to other policies.  Judge Suko very property found that reviewing the wrong policy is per-se bad faith on the part of an insurer.  Fortunately, in Washington the insured is at least in a position to be fairly compensated in extra-contractual damages for that kind of behavior, through Washington's robust bad-faith set of laws.  In Oregon, the story would be different, unfortunately.

DYE SEED, INC. v. FARMLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Dist. Court, ED Washington 2013 - Google Scholar:

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Washington Federal Court Permits Deposition of Carrier's Former Coverage Attorney

On October 30, 2013 Judge Martinez of the Western District of Washington permitted the policyholder in a long-running bad faith case to take the deposition of the carrier's former coverage counsel, Joanne Henry, about the coverage analysis that she performed for the carrier leading to the carrier denying the tender of defense.  This decision relied heavily on the landmark 2011 Cedell decision from the Washington Supreme Court which, broadly speaking, abrogated in part the attorney-client privilege where the attorney was acting as an adjuster, taking on one of the "quasi-fiduciary" roles of a potentially defending insurer.  Judge Martinez held that because the policyholder had reason to believe that Ms. Henry did the entire coverage investigation herself, in addition to performing legal analysis of the policy, the policyholder could take her deposition, although the carrier could object if a question that genuinely intruded into the privilege was asked.

Magistrate Judge Sullivan Endorses Conventional Wisdom on Oregon Bad Faith Claims

It is conventional wisdom in the insurance coverage bar that there is no bad faith claim available when a liability insurer breaches the duty to defend.  This is based on several rather old cases.  In more modern times the Oregon Court of Appeals has suggested that the issue may be ripe for re-examination.  But in this decision (link below) federal Magistrate Judge Sullivan adopted the conventional wisdom and granted a motion to dismiss the policyholder's bad faith claim.  What is somewhat remarkable here is that this is an environmental contamination coverage claim governed (it appears) under the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act.  That Act was amended effective June 10, 2013 (a few weeks before this decision came down) to provide for bad faith claims in these kinds of situations (whether the amendments would apply here may be an open question).  No objections were filed, so Judge Hernandez adopted Judge Sullivan's findings without review.  This case may be a good illustration of exactly why the amendments (SB 814) adopted this legislative session were so necessary.

Russell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Dist. Court, D. Oregon 2013 - Google Scholar:

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Washington Court Smacks Down Lloyd's Effort to "Cook the Books"

Subcontractors on construction projects are commonly required to provide "additional insured" liability coverage to the general contractor.  The coverage is available to the extent that the general is liable because of the subcontractor's negligence - which is the case most of the time.  In Oregon it is rare for a subcontractor's carrier to actually agree to defend a general contractor because of a lack of bad faith exposure.  However, in Washington it is much more common, thanks to Washington's pro-policyholder coverage law.  That makes it much more expensive for the subcontractor's carrier, who has to defend two entities.  In this case the carrier for the subcontractor, Lloyd's, tried to terminate its obligation to defend the general contractor by paying for the subcontractor to settle with the underlying claimant, and including language in the settlement agreement "stipulating" that the subcontractor actually had no liability (obviously a subterfuge, because if that were true Lloyd's would not have settled the case).  Then Lloyd's stopped paying to defend the general contractor.  In a coverage action between the general's carrier (Zurich) and Lloyd's, Judge Bryan saw clear through Lloyd's breach of its duties to its additional insured, the general, denying summary judgment to Lloyd's for breaching a contractual duty to defend, and suggested that there may be a claim for bad faith in there as well.

We see these kinds of aggressive carrier tactics every day.  It is nice to see a judge calling a carrier out on it.


ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON, Dist. Court, WD Washington 2013 - Google Scholar:

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Alabama Federal Trial Court Dismisses Bad Faith Claim Over Defense of PRP Letter

One of the issues that we cover closely is environmental coverage litigation, and particularly coverage issues similar to the coverage fights that are taking place about the massive Portland Harbor Superfund Site.  Our firm has been at the forefront of making good law on those coverage issues including the first decision establishing that carriers have a duty to defend against the EPA's coercive "104(e)" information request demands, and also establishing that under Oregon law carriers have a duty to defend a "Potentially Responsible Party" (PRP) letter.  Both of those cases were decided under Oregon's somewhat unique state law, but in arguing about the PRP letter issue we noted that almost all other states have decided that a PRP letter triggers the duty to defend, including just recently (December 2012), Alabama.  Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the policyholder who won that dispute about the existence of the duty to defend has now lost out on its bad faith claim, because the trial court determined that when the insurance company denied the claim the issue was fairly debatable, and therefore the decision was not made in bad faith.  This is an excellent illustration of how, even if Oregon caught up to most of the rest of the nation by enacting a bad faith cause of action (like HB 3160), insurance companies can often still avoid paying for taking aggressive coverage positions, rather than stepping up to the plate and giving the benefit of the doubt to their policyholders.

ALABAMA GAS CORPORATION v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Dist. Court, ND Alabama 2013 - Google Scholar:

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Oregon Supreme Court's Bresee Decision Makes the "Headlines"

The good folks at the large national firm Farella Braun posted this excellent summary of the Oregon Supreme Court's late-2012 decision in Bresee v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.  In Bresee the court made it clear that an insurer's decision to provide a defense under a liability policy must be based on only the words of the underlying complaint or other charging document itself, and that any ambiguity -- any ambiguity, including one created by the lack of specific allegations -- is construed in favor of providing the defense.  In that specific case the insurance company denied a defense based on a "completed operations" exclusion based on the insurance company's interpretation of the underlying complaint, which is said indicated that the property damage had occurred after "operations" were "complete."  As Farella's blog post points out, the court's admonition to insurance carriers that they cannot use such "reading between the lines" to deny a defense is a straightforward proposition - so straightforward, in fact, that most states permit a policyholder who is denied a defense to seek punitive or exemplary damages, via a bad faith claim, to deter insurance companies from the practice.  Unfortunately, unless HB 3160 or something like it passes, insurance companies will continue to ignore Bresee and its forebears (which they do, every day) because even though it is a clear-cut breach of their obligations to policyholders, in Oregon insurers get a "free breach," as I explained in my recent letter to Senator Betsy Johnson in support of HB 3160/the SB 414-A amendment.

Vote on SB 414, Permitting Insurance Commission to Order Restitution, Set for Today

Whether this bill will be useful to small business remains to be seen, but it is certainly a step in the right direction. However, as the "preferred alternative" by the insurance industry to real insurance claims handling reform, one has to assume that the industry will exert its pressure to keep the benefits of this change in the law restricted to consumers, who may remain unaware of the availability of recourse to the state's complaint process.

K-12 budget meltdown, wine and beer: Oregon Legislature today | OregonLive.com:

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A Nice Summary of How Insurance Reform In Oregon Has Fared This Legislative Session

The Lund Report has a great piece today recapping how it came to be that SB 414 and SB 814 moved through the Legislature while HB 3160 has stalled, again.  It continues to be painful to see how successfully the insurance industry has distorted the issues and the relationship between a private right of action and the regulatory oversight exercised by the Insurance Commission.  As my former colleague Jim Guse of Ball Janik points out in this piece, Washington's bad faith law has had the entirely salutary effect of shortening the time in which claims are paid, and removing the incentive that carriers now have in Oregon to "roll the dice" on coverage litigation, exposing their small business insureds (in liability cases) to potentially disastrous consequences - including unpaid judgments, which for a contractor can mean the loss of a license.

Shields Pushes to Empower DCBS as Effort to Put Insurance Under UTPA Flounders | The Lund Report:

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Insurance Industry Invests Heavily in Defeating Bad Faith Legislation

HB 3160, which among other things would give small business owners a private right of action against insurance companies for violating the state Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Statute, is still alive as the legislative session draws nearer its close, and the insurance industry and those that might be held to account under the bill continue to invest heavily in lobbying efforts to make sure that it again does not make it to the floor.  Among the canards that the industry continues to throw out there is that this is 'radical' reform, but failing to note that most states have some version of this kind of private right of action, or some other bad faith right of action, under state law.  I recently worked on a survey of bad faith law in the Pacific Northwest as my firm continues to expand its practice base, and was dismayed to note that Oregon lags behind even conservative states like Montana and Idaho in giving small business owners the leverage that they need, through a potential bad faith claim, to get insurance companies to step up when the going gets rough.  My Father's Day wish?  That the legislators currently on the fence, including Sen. Betsy Johnson, realize that this bill is not about enriching "tort lawyers" but is about bringing the insurance code into the modern era to protect ordinary Oregonians, including Oregon's small business owners.


Dozens of lobbyists tie up bill to let consumers sue insurance companies | OregonLive.com:

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Letter to Sen. Johnson Supporting SB414 - Small Business Needs Protection Beyond Environmental Claims

Here is the letter that I just sent to Senator Betsy Johnson urging her to support SB414, which has a work session scheduled for today.  In it I describe the experience of my client Anderson Brothers, Inc. with its attempt to get its insurance company to help defend it against an environmental claim, and explain that although the SB814 amendment to the OECAA was great work, most coverage problems faced by small business are not covered by the OECAA, and that SB414 would therefore help level the tremendously un-level playing field in Oregon.

Oregon Insurance Reform Champions Continue to Press for Broader Change

Champions of changes to the insurance code that would benefit policyholders, both commercial and individual, are not giving up hope on the idea behind HB3160, which was to remove the exemption of insurance companies from the Oregon Unfair Trade Practices act.  One key component of that effort was to enact a private right of action for violations of Oregon's Unfair Claims Settlement  Practices Act (UCSPA).  At this point the consumer protections in that law are only enforceable by the Insurance Division, which does not have the resources to act on every instance of insurer misbehavior, and has limited ability to make consumers whole.  The insurance industry howled at the idea of being subject to the Unfair Trade Practices Act, so legislators are now proposing a more focused amendment to the UCSPA in SB 414, available here.  While not perfect, this legislation would be a broad-based improvement that would help level the incredibly uneven playing field that Oregon's small businesses now must play on to get their insurance companies to honor their contracts and step up when called upon.

Governor Signs SB814, amending Oregon's unique environmental insurance coverage law

The Governor of Oregon has now signed into law far-reaching changes to ORS 465.475 et seq, the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act.  The changes include, most notably, addition of a specific cause of action against an insurer for bad faith denial of coverage, patterned on the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA).  Although constitutional challenges to the statute are a near-certainty, many provisions of the law will be beyond challenge and may help change the power dynamic between carriers and policyholders on environmental coverage issues in Oregon.  And as I have mentioned before, in light of the staggering projected cost of the Portland Harbor Superfund Site ($2 billion and growing), if this law does what it was designed to do it may be the largest change in Oregon insurance law by total dollar value in recent memory.  Many, many businesses (large and small) have become ensnared in the Superfund action and this law will help skilled policy-holder side lawyers representing those businesses clear some of the significant hurdles to getting indemnity coverage to fund the cleanup.

SB 814 :: Oregon Legislature Bill Tracker - Your Government - The Oregonian:

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Utah Court Holds That "Fairly Debatable" Defense to Bad Faith Goes to the Jury

Here in Oregon with our relative paucity of reported bad faith cases we don't see too much of it, but in other states insurers can be sued for bad faith for a claim denial, unless the claim's validity was "fairly debatable" (or a similar standard).  Now that it looks like at least for environmental claims we'll have something like a bad faith claim, this defense will get more play.  A recent decision out of Utah came to what seems like a common sense decision about whether a "fairly debatable" defense can be the subject of a carrier-side summary judgment motion.  No, said the court in Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange - by its nature, there is a factual component to such a defense and it is for the jury.  Since carriers usually do not fare so well in jury trials, this kind of approach will hopefully have the result of prompting reasonable settlements, which is good public policy.

Washington and Now Idaho Limit Attorney-Client Privilege in Bad Faith Cases

My former colleagues at Bullivant Houser Bailey have done a nice job of summarizing two recent decisions, one from Washington and one from Idaho, limiting the application of the attorney-client privilege where outside coverage counsel participates in a fact investigation for coverage purposes.  Both decisions (Idaho's Stewart Title v. Credit Suisse in federal court, Washington's Cedell v. Farmers in state court) made it clear that an insurance company cannot seek to shield a coverage determination made in bad faith behind the privilege by using outside counsel, whether it's a first-party or a third-party coverage issue.  In both cases the insured sought discovery of counsel's work product to support a bad-faith claim.  It is hard enough to prove bad faith in either state; it's nice to see judges recognizing a common carrier tactic for what it is: an effort to make it nearly impossible.



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Oregon Senate Committee Makes "Do Pass" Recommendation for Insurance UTPA Bill

Reports of the demise of HB 3160, which would remove the exemption of insurance from claims under Oregon's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), may have been wrong.  The Oregon Senate Consumer and Small Business Committee has made a "do pass" recommendation on the bill.  However, the measure has been referred to the Rules committee.  As the legislative session winds down, predictions had been that the opposition of small-town insurance brokers, in-state carriers like The Standard, and Associated Oregon Industries was going to again spell defeat for this common-sense measure.  Hopefully proponents will succeed in pulling out a victory in the coming days.

HB 3160 :: Oregon Legislature Bill Tracker - Your Government - The Oregonian:

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Speaker of Oregon House Signs SB 814, Amending Oregon Environmental Insurance Claims Law

SB 814 :: Oregon Legislature Bill Tracker - Your Government - The Oregonian:

Now all that remains is for the Governor to sign, and the largest change in Oregon insurance law (in potential dollar value) in recent memory will kick in.  Check back for a full analysis of the potential ramifications of this new law on policyholders, particularly those involved in the Portland Harbor Superfund Site.
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